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7Introduction
This issue of Global Dialogues draws on a two-day event 
organized by the Centre for Global Cooperation Research in 
the spring of 2015. Bringing together academics and policy-
makers from Crimea, Russia, Ukraine, Canada, and Germany, 
the meeting explored the current situation in Crimea, day-to-
day life in the region, relations – present and future – between 
Ukraine and Russia, and the role of the West in finding a 
cooperative solution to the conflict.
The future of Ukraine remains uncertain. Although the 
Crimean secession was virtually bloodless, the position of 
the peninsula’s minority populations is still unclear. One 
year post-referendum, Crimea is de facto Russian territory, 
incorporated at both political and societal levels, whilst in 
Eastern Ukraine, hostilities have significantly intensified. 
Recent surveys indicate that a substantial majority of the 
Crimean population support the Russian annexation and feel 
safe and secure in the territory. At the same time, a survey 
published by the Kiev-based Democratic Initiative Foundation 
found that 68 per cent of Ukrainians considered Crimea still 
to be part of Ukraine.1 Who is right – the majority in Crimea or 
the Ukrainians who still see Crimea as part of Ukraine? Given 
these divergent perspectives, what does the future of Crimea 
hold for Ukraine as a whole? Can we expect more sanctions 
and more conflict in the shorter term – and along with these a 
wider role for regional organizations? Can a middle ground be 
found, based on political solutions and regional cooperation? 
What are the entry-points for engaging Crimea’s minorities?
Events in Crimea have, without question, brought an irre-
vocable change in the dynamic of Ukraine–Russian relations. 
They exemplify to some extent a clash of methodological 
paradigms in international relations. One the one hand, we 
have the Western approach to conflict-resolution, with its 
focus on universal values such as the common good, the 
inviolability of national sovereignty, international justice, and 
the rule of law. On the other, we have a framework based 
on geopolitical strategy and characterized by major-power 
spheres of influence and so-called ‘realpolitik’. This is the 
path which present-day Russia has chosen to follow. The two 
disparate approaches have given rise to distinct, parallel 
discourses, with very few openings for dialogue.
When it comes to the situation of ethnic minorities in 
Crimea, there are concerns about the situation of the Tatar 
peoples, which has become much more precarious over 
the last year. Raids of homes and mosques, confiscation of 
religious literature, arrests of religious activists, and the 
application of pressure on Tatar media have all become more 
common during this period. These new realities have brought 
new challenges: we may see a rise in the number of Tatars 
leaving the peninsula, or we may see increased radicalization 
of Crimea’s Tatar community under the banner of Islam. 
1  http://dif.org.ua/ua/events/-
krlitiki--sprijannja-.htm.
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A ‘Caucasus scenario’ for Crimea has wide currency amongst 
those with expert knowledge of the situation of Islam in post-
Soviet space.
In Russia, pressure on NGOs has intensified, with political 
activists and opponents of the regime being harassed and 
intimidated. The most recent and most acutely felt example 
of this was the murder of opposition politician Boris Nemtsov. 
Meanwhile, the Russian public continues to have very little 
influence on politics. As far as Crimea is concerned, the 
territory has been fully integrated into Russia as a Federal 
District endowed with a unique administrative system and 
generous federal funding. As things currently stand, the ma-
jority of people in Crimea have good reason to keep up their 
robust defence of President Putin.
It is possible that the situation in Crimea will remain frozen 
for the foreseeable future. Although military recapture is an 
unthinkable prospect, and – for this and other reasons – a 
return of Crimea to Ukraine is unlikely, the peninsula’s legal 
and political status is likely to remain uncertain. Economically, 
Crimea’s star will now rise and fall with Russian fortunes: if 
sanctions are eased and the Russian economy picks up over 
the next twelve months – as a result of the exploitation 
of natural resources in the Black Sea region, for example – 
Crimea could well benefit from increased tourism and the 
growth this brings with it. That said, one year post annexation, 
Crimea’s status remains uncertain: members of the political 
establishment declare it to be part of Ukraine, but there is 
little or no investment in policy-processes that would make 
this assertion a reality. The proposal to create a Ministry of 
Occupied Territories remains mired in controversy and the 
physical control which Ukraine wields over Crimea via services 
such as electricity and water, internet provision, and telephone 
communications has so far not been used as leverage in 
negotiations with Crimea’s political elite – though Crimeans 
do have to contend with the continued suspension of rail-links 
with Ukraine. The policy of the Ukrainian government towards 
Ukrainians who prefer to stay in Crimea is also very unclear.
Even assuming a scenario – in which, for example, Crimea’s 
current status is reconciled with international law and 
Russian occupation is legalized – it will probably take up to 
a generation, if not longer, for the Russian incorporation of 
Crimea to be fully accepted. From the European standpoint, 
it makes sense to monitor the situation on an ongoing basis, 
always bearing in mind that a simple and speedy solution is 
unlikely. A complex dynamic typical of modern international 
relations is at work here, involving a mix of geopolitics and 
global cooperation.
On the broader question of Ukraine’s future: few would 
have imagined, a little over a year ago, that the country would 
be facing problems such as loss of territory, ongoing military 
conflict, economic decline, and social and humanitarian 
instability, notably in the Donbas region. Despite these 
difficulties, however, Ukrainian social activism – on the part 
of volunteer and civil-society organizations, for example – 
continues to shape and influence Kiev’s political structures. 
Meanwhile in Russia, civil society has become somewhat 
polarized over the conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s role in it, 
with the greater part of Russian society, and the majority 
of Russian political parties, continuing to support President 
Putin and his cabinet.
Ukraine still has difficulties with the methodological 
interpretation of nation-building and with perceptions 
of ‘the other’. Having lived in the shadow of ‘Big Brother’ 
for so long, and having acquiesced to myths about ‘brother 
nations’ (‘bratskie narody’), the country continued, even 
after independence in 1991, to be what was, for all intents 
and purposes, a colony, with a political elite conditioned by 
colonial-style thinking. Now involved in a dramatic conflict 
and afflicted by various kinds of social, political, and physical 
trauma, the country is searching for a new national ideal. Talk 
of ‘the Other’, in the guise of Russia/the Soviet Union, has 
become the dominant narrative in political and social circles.
Some interesting insights can be gained by reconstructing 
the process of transformation undergone by the Ukrainian 
‘grand narrative’ at the height of the crisis in Kiev last year 
and more recently in Eastern Ukraine. Because of the current 
configuration of events, with its emphasis on confrontation, 
war, and the pursuit of victory, masculinity has acquired a 
markedly symbolic quality. Opportunities to emulate, and 
share in, the glory attaching to bygone Ukrainian heroes 
abound and the concept of man as defender and warrior 
is eliciting particular interest and regard in Ukrainian 
political discourse. The Euromaidan protests emphasized 
the continuity of this masculinized national narrative and 
reinforced its standpoints and attitudes. A mythologized and 
heroic past is evoked, in which women too are portrayed as 
warriors of epic stature.
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The Future of Crimea:  
The Crimean Tatar  
Perspective
Elmira Muratova
Any analysis of the situation in Crimea, and of what lies in store 
for the region, has to take into account the Crimean Tatar 
perspective. The March 2014 referendum on the peninsula’s 
status and, following this, the incorporation of Crimea 
into the Russian Federation have lent urgency to the Tatar 
question and seen it surface as a topic of wide-ranging debate 
at various international venues. More than ever before, the 
leaders of the Crimean Tatar community are looking to the 
international community to help them safeguard Tatar rights.
Anyone familiar with the history of the Crimean Tatars will 
appreciate the irony of the scenario currently being played out 
in the region. An indigenous people of Crimea, the Crimean 
Tatars experienced great suffering during both the Russian 
and the Soviet regimes. Their attitudes to the so-called 
‘Crimean Spring’ have been shaped by the memory of the 
dramatic events of their history – the annexation of Crimea 
in the late eighteenth century and the mass deportations of 
1944 – which are engraved in their collective consciousness. 
Recent events elicit in them a sense of déjà vu, a sense of 
something familiar and poignant. Unsurprisingly, the stance 
taken by the Crimean Tatars has been actively pro-Ukrainian, 
based on the hope that the new government in Kiev would 
bring about positive change across society. One of the changes 
most sought after by the Tatars was recognition of their 
status as an indigenous people of Crimea and the restoration 
of the rights that flow from this. Unfortunately, the long-
awaited Ukrainian decision on this came too late – in the 
spring of 2014, when Crimea was already under Russian rule. 
Part I
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incompetence, unemployment, and the late payment of 
salaries) has become more difficult and effectively limited the 
organized protection of rights.
Recent research on xenophobia in Ukraine during 2014, 
against the backdrop of revolution and intervention, shows 
that Crimean Tatars are one of the main targets of discrimi-
nation by Crimean authorities. For this reason, the involve-
ment of third parties – particularly human-rights missions 
permanently based in Crimea – would be a positive move. 
Missions of this kind should be established under the aegis 
of the United Nations or the European Union and should be 
tasked with monitoring the protection of human rights in 
the peninsula. In April 2015, an unofficial Turkish delegation 
visited Crimea to assess the situation of the Crimean Tatars. 
This shows not only that initiatives of this kind are possible 
despite all the diplomatic obstacles but also that they can 
have a positive influence. If such missions were international, 
they could be even more effective.
International organizations can also play a useful part in 
tackling the isolation currently being experienced by Crimean 
citizens. Many Crimeans hold pro-Ukrainian and pro-European 
views and feel doubly punished by the Ukrainian government’s 
obstructive attitude in regard to relocation from Crimea to 
Ukraine. For many, the door to Ukraine is now closed: they 
are unable to resolve problems with their paperwork, cannot 
visit their relatives, and are prevented from applying for 
foreign visas. This piles added problems onto an already over-
burdened Crimean population and stirs up anti-Ukrainian 
feeling even amongst those supportive of Kiev’s cause.
For some Tatars, the decision was nonetheless a source of 
moral satisfaction, signalling as it did acknowledgement of 
their pro-Ukrainian stance; others viewed it as belated and 
purely rhetorical.
After 200 years, the Crimean Tatars are once again feeling 
like outcasts in their own homeland, suspecting Crimean 
authorities of wanting to drive them completely out of 
the peninsula. The pressure being exerted on the Tatar’s 
representative body, the Mejlis, is seen as an attempt to 
weaken the Crimean Tatar national movement and rob it of 
the leadership that could marshal popular opposition to 
the Russian authorities. The raids on the homes of Crimean 
Tatar activists and on the mosques and madrasas (Muslim 
schools), the confiscation of religious literature, the summons 
to appear before investigative committees – all these are 
perceived as attempts to sow fear and panic among the 
Tatars and pressurize them into leaving Crimea. Despite 
these difficulties, some Tatars plan to stay in their homeland. 
Others (including members of the intelligentsia, business 
people, and practising Muslims) fear for their personal safety 
and have moved to Ukraine or elsewhere. According to figures 
published by Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy on 18 May 2015, 
of the 20,000 and more Crimean citizens who have moved to 
other parts of Ukraine since the troubles began , about half 
are Crimean Tatars.
A number of worrying trends make it difficult to be optimistic 
about Crimea’s future. For one thing, civil-society structures 
are being destroyed and replaced by ‘quasi’ equivalents. The 
Mejlis, for example, formerly a representative body elected 
by the Council of the Crimean Tatar People (Qurultai), has 
been forced to change its leadership and register as a regular 
public organization. Crimean Tatars, who had a long record 
of excellent organization and an established set of public 
institutions, now find themselves in the position of having to 
have every public activity approved by the authorities. Where 
Crimean Tatar organizations are concerned, only events of a 
cultural nature, and only those organized by individuals loyal 
to the authorities, have any chance of being approved. All 
the activities currently being run within the Crimean Tatar 
community consist either of courses in the Crimean Tatar 
language or youth competitions centred on culture or religion.
Worrying trends are also emerging in inter-ethnic relations. 
The events of the ‘Crimean Spring’ have exacerbated ethnic 
divisions between Russians and Crimean Tatars. This is 
reflected, for example, in the fall in inter-ethnic marriages 
and the increase in divorce in this category. Mistrust of people 
from other ethnic groups has also grown, having almost 
returned to the levels of the 1990s, when Tatar repatriation 
had just begun. Bringing people together to tackle increasingly 
common cross-group problems (such as corruption, official 
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One of the models which experts on the development of Islam 
in the post-Soviet space most often discuss in relation to the 
emergent situation in Crimea is the ‘Caucasus scenario’. But 
exactly what form would this scenario take in the peninsula? 
We know of several possible permutations. One – typically 
dubbed the ‘Dagestan scenario’ – would involve an unremitting 
but low-level terrorist-type war between loyalists and (playing 
the part of the radical Islamists in Dagestan) Tatars. Such a 
scenario is implausible. If anything, Crimea is more likely to 
face a situation similar to that in Chechnya. This is because 
Russia is set on running Crimea in the same way that it runs 
the North Caucasus, a stance prompted at least in part by its 
distrust of the local ethnic Russians and its belief that it can 
exploit the Crimean Tatars for its own purposes.
Moscow’s distrust of the local ethnic Russian leadership 
is so deep that Crimea’s ethnic Russian population may one 
day come to view the period of Ukrainian rule as a golden age 
during which they were able to manage their affairs largely 
without outside interference – a situation which Moscow will 
not allow to continue. Having annexed the peninsula, the 
central Russian government has made it into a new Crimean 
Federal District and appointed Sergey Belaventsev, a non-
Crimean Russian, to run it. More importantly, the Kremlin has 
assigned the task of overseeing the peninsula’s integration 
into Russia to Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak, former 
Pro-consul in the North Caucasus – who, according to those 
who saw him in action there, has his own distinctive ‘method’ 
of dealing with things. Under his direction, claim expert 
observers of this region, Moscow began increasingly to rely 
on long-established local clans rather than attempt any 
overhaul of the system. This approach, I would argue, was 
Crimea:  
Russia’s Other Chechnya?
Ivan Preobrazhenskiy
driven by Moscow’s desire to find an ally in the fight against 
the Islamists in the Caucasus, but its negative effects are now 
making themselves felt in the form of increasing corruption, 
rising nationalism, and the marginalization of local ethnic 
Russians, who, in order to retain any influence, have been 
forced to ally themselves with one of the ethnic clans.
On the face of it, the situation in the North Caucasus seems 
to bear little relation to conditions in Crimea, where there 
is a sizeable Russian majority, a high proportion of Russian-
speaking Ukrainians, and only a small contingent of Crimean 
Tatars (14 per cent of the total population). Many in Moscow 
would appear to think otherwise. Besides putting Kozak in 
charge, they have announced a number of initiatives designed 
to boost the position of the Crimean Tatars at the expense 
of the rest of the population. In one move, for example, 
Moscow has called for the recognition of three official 
languages in the peninsula: Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean 
Tatar. It has also sought, in various ways, to buy the loyalty 
of the Crimean Tatar nation – or at least of some of its clans. 
Most significantly, Putin himself has spoken of the need for 
the matter of the final rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars, 
deported en masse by Stalin, to be resolved. Such a measure 
will involve providing additional compensation and settling 
the question of land-ownership by regularizing the status of 
houses constructed illegally on land seized by the Crimean 
Tatars. It will also involve setting aside quotas of seats for 
Tatars in the Crimean Republic’s parliament. In short, events 
in Crimea are likely to follow the same course as those in 
Kozak’s North Caucasus. This will include the continued de 
facto appointment of the head of the region by Russia and 
the forging of alliances between this official and local ‘clans’ – 
more likely the Crimean Tatars than the ethnic Russians, and 
certainly not the Ukrainians. In its turn, this balancing-act act 
will lead to Moscow’s special economic relations with Crimea 
being transformed into direct dependence on the centre and 
its oil and gas revenues – in just the same way as has happened 
in North Caucasus, particularly Chechnya. The new system of 
administration will be fashioned by those who celebrated the 
peninsula’s return to Russia; but these same sections of the 
population risk becoming the chief victims of these changes if 
what they get is not a truly popular system of governance but 
a Crimean satrapy.
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focused most of its efforts on threatening Russia, or punishing 
it, specifically targeting its leader, Vladimir Putin. Almost no 
diplomatic effort was expended in engaging the Crimeans 
themselves. In the lead-up to the Russian annexation, the world 
was treated to a steady stream of grave pronouncements from 
various representatives of the State Department and White 
House, notably John Kerry and Samantha Power, all of them 
vilifying the Russian leader. Though often skilfully crafted and 
impressive in their rhetoric, these messages had little impact 
on their intended target – the Russian government. The 
almost maniacal enthusiasm with which the media, academics, 
and policy-makers in the United States took up the anti-
Putin mantra came as both a surprise and a disappointment. 
The Russian leader’s every word was dissected and the usual 
analogies were resorted to, with Putin being variously likened 
to Hitler or Stalin – a tactic no doubt employed by Western 
leaders in order to try to impress on their publics just how dire 
the situation was. To the New Europe and the frontier states 
bordering on Ukraine, whose populations had lived through 
Nazi and Soviet occupation, these analogies struck home with 
particular force.
In sum, Western policy in the lead-up to the Crimean 
referendum was aimed primarily at punishing Putin or coercing 
him into a desired course of action. It made little attempt to 
address the factors that persuaded him to send his forces into 
Crimea in the first place. John Kerry, for example, repeatedly 
sought to discredit Putin’s claims that he had intervened at the 
request of the Crimean leadership and that he was concerned 
about the safety of the Russian population in the peninsula. The 
only kind of overture made to the Crimean people themselves 
consisted in warning them repeatedly that they were being 
manipulated by Russia for its own interests. Suggestions that 
the referendum was a sham and had succeeded only because 
it was held at gun-point completely missed the point. The 
Americans, it seemed, were not interested in what the people 
of Crimea wanted – and what the majority of them clearly 
wanted was to not be part of Ukraine anymore.
In fact, Crimea had long seen popular support for 
reunification with Russia. These sentiments were ultimately 
expressed in the phrasing of the questions posed to the 
people of Crimea. Two questions were on the table: Should 
Crimea be part of the Russian Federation and should Crimea 
restore Crimea’s Constitution of 1992 that gave the region 
more autonomy and remain as part of Ukraine? The first 
question regarding membership in the Russian Federation is 
an important one. The Russian Federation was recognised in 
international law as the successor state of the Soviet Union. 
In essence, the referendum question was asking Crimeans to 
decide if they should return to the status quo ante before the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. 
Crimea in Retrospect: 
Missed Opportunities?
David Carment
When, on 6 March 2014, the Crimean parliament brought 
forward the date of the proposed referendum on the status 
of Crimea to 16 March,1 this left little time or opportunity 
either for a dialogue to be brokered between the conflicting 
parties or for Crimeans to ponder the significance of their 
choice. At the time, many analysts were asking whether 
the Crimean crisis would inevitably lead to armed conflict. 
With war looming, the need for a political, or indeed legal, 
solution to the dispute was obvious. Although, diplomatically 
speaking, nothing of significance subsequently emerged, the 
dire warnings and threats from the West regarding Russian 
expansion were unhelpful and unnecessary.
We know that Ukraine’s leaders were taken by surprise at 
the speed of events, but the government seemed, in any case, 
unable or unwilling to engage in negotiations with Russia, even 
as a way of thwarting the latter in the pursuit of its strategic 
goals. Few, if any, of the politicians in Kiev or the West were 
prepared to entertain alternative scenarios for resolving the 
crisis, refusing even to contemplate the notion of increased 
autonomy for Crimea – never mind the possibility of its 
secession. When proposals of this kind finally made it onto the 
table, it was too late. In hindsight, it is possible to identify a 
number of reasons for this diplomatic failure.
Blinkered strategies
For one thing, apart from the threat of sanctions, there was 
little evidence of any interest in the political and economic 
situation of the Crimean people. Having chosen to take the 
diplomatic lead in challenging Moscow, the USA, for example, 
1  It had initially been scheduled 
for May and later for 30 March.
1918
That many Crimeans were ultimately convinced that this first 
choice was reasonable is evident in the second question that 
asked for a return to the 1992 Constitution. Consider that 
in January 1991, through a referendum, Crimea regained its 
status as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which gave 
extended rights to the peninsula. On 26 February 1992, the 
Verkhovniy Sovet proclaimed self-government as the Republic 
of Crimea (adding a few days later a paragraph ‘as a part of 
independent Ukraine’.)
During this period, using the weakness of the central 
Ukrainian government and relying on Russian support, the 
Crimean local elite voted for its first Crimean constitution 
on May 5 1992 and, within a few months, the position of the 
President of Crimea was established. In the summer of 1992, an 
all Crimea referendum was held and a majority of the population 
voted in support of the new Crimean Constitution. This is the 
point of reference the question of March 16 considered. So, 
in essence Crimeans were being asked to turn back the clock 
to a time when they had previously considered breaking away 
from Ukraine. Like today, the 1990s were a period of economic 
and political uncertainty for Ukraine. It took the then leader, 
Leonid Kuchma, the better part of a year to muster enough 
support from the Kiev elite to start the political process of 
getting the Crimean peninsula reintegrated into Ukraine – a 
process which many Crimeans resisted. In 1995, the Ukrainian 
parliament voted to review the position of Crimea within the 
Ukraine, scrapping the Crimean constitution and removing the 
then president of Crimea, Yuriy Meshkov, from office for his 
anti-state activities and his support for integration with Russia.
Against this background, it comes as no surprise that the 
Kiev government should have declared the 2014 referendum 
illegal – on the grounds that the Ukrainian constitution made 
no provision for it. John Kerry, meanwhile, argued that the 
whole of Ukraine should have been given the opportunity 
to vote on the issues involved. Neither of these responses 
was adequate, given the lack of mechanisms for enforcing 
corresponding solutions on all the parties concerned. Simply 
put, if the United States was serious about finding an 
alternative to Russian annexation of Crimea, the conditions 
that followed from this should have been clearly laid out by 
its lead diplomats. Apart from the threat of sanctions, no 
meaningful or adequate mechanism of enforcement was 
proposed as a curb on Russian annexation. And in retrospect 
even the sanctions did not produce the intended effect.
Again, the approach on the Russian side essentially consisted 
in questioning the legitimacy of the Kiev government’s claim 
to Crimea, based on precedent, experience, and Crimean 
sentiment. The results of recent surveys showing strong 
Crimean support for remaining within Russia suggest this was a 
strategy that found favour with the majority on the peninsula. 
Had there been meaningful negotiations, however, attention 
might instead have focused on the long-term political and 
economic viability of Crimea’s remaining within Ukraine. In 
this connection, it is worth noting that some (but not many) 
Crimeans now question whether it was ever a good idea 
to be part of Ukraine: in 2008, despite already being an 
autonomous republic, Crimea, reliant on Kiev for two-thirds 
of its (dwindling) regional budget, was particularly hard hit by 
the recession.
Conversely, the West could have spelled out the costs 
of Crimean absorption into Russia. With a population of 
just over two million, a weak, dependent economy, and 
poor water and electricity supplies, the peninsula has now 
become something of an economic burden to Russia. And yet 
neither the international community nor Kiev spelled out this 
possibility. There were bail-outs and aid-packages for Kiev, 
but the economic and political benefits that would accrue 
to the Crimeans from staying in a unified Ukraine were never 
properly explained to them.
Security concerns disregarded
Another reason for the failure in diplomacy was an unwill-
ingness to address Russia’s legitimate security concerns. A 
compromise might have been possible, for example, whereby 
Sevastopol was annexed, but Crimea resumed its 1992 con-
stitution and remained an autonomous part of Ukraine. Even 
when part of Ukraine, Sevastopol was a ‘city with special 
status’ and the area in which it was included was a distinct 
municipality, separate from Crimea. The majority (over 70 per 
cent) of the city’s residents are ethnic Russians. In addition, it 
is home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (and formerly also to the 
Ukrainian Naval Forces), the naval facilities having previously 
been leased to Russia by Ukraine. An independent Sevastopol 
might have been enough to satisfy Russia’s strategic needs – 
and the Sevastopol city council in fact held a referendum of its 
own on accession to Russia.
Finally, we come to Crimea’s Ukrainian and Tatar minorities, 
numbering around 25 per cent and 13 per cent respectively 
of the region’s overall population. Most members of these 
minorities live in four sub-regions in the north of Crimea. 
Historically, they have sought the union of Herson oblast 
with the adjoining oblasts in Ukraine proper. A second possible 
territorial compromise would have been to allow these four 
oblasts to remain in Ukraine, with the rest of Crimea and the 
city of Sevastopol coming under Russian control.
None of the solutions mentioned were easy choices, and it may 
be that none of them was obvious to the parties in conflict, who 
were acting under immense pressure to avoid a full-blown crisis. 
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Fighting a myth is no more possible than fighting a dream – 
perhaps because a myth is itself a dream. The only way to 
vanquish a myth is with the help of another one. ‘Myth’ is not 
simply a synonym for ‘fiction’. In the classical sense, it meant 
a framework of ideas through which people made sense 
of the world and their place within it. It might be defined 
as a way of conceiving the architecture of the surrounding 
universe, the past and present, values and taboos. Against 
this background, the current conflict in Ukraine can be seen 
as a battle between the Russian myth about the country 
and the country’s own myth about itself. And seen from 
this perspective, the nub of the problem lies in Crimea, 
because although the peninsula has a Russian myth in place, 
no Ukrainian counterpart has so far emerged and Ukraine 
instead relies on Crimean Tatar narratives.
The Russian Myth
The ancient city of Chersonese,1 the ‘Crimean Riviera’ beloved 
of the early twentieth-century Russian intelligentsia, the 
southern palaces, Alexander Pushkin’s sojourn in the region, 
the heroic defence of Sevastopol during the Crimean War, the 
tragedy of the White officers in the 1920s, the second defence 
of Sevastopol in World War II – all these have long since 
become part and parcel of the Russian notion of Crimea, in 
particular the version of it that seeks to justify Russian control 
over the peninsula. Analysing the ethnic composition of the 
Three Myths for Crimea: 
Does Ukraine’s Version 
Have a Chance?
Pavel Kazarin
1  The Ancient City of Tauric Cher-
sonese and its Chora is a UNESCO 
World Heritage Site, http://whc.
unesco.org/en/list/1411.
Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence to show that ethnic 
groups can reach negotiated solutions through political and 
territorial compromise. In addition, history shows that such 
solutions often only present themselves after years, if not 
decades, of war. The Crimean crisis was an opportunity to 
show the world that blood need not be spilled and states need 
not collapse.
Had there been greater openness to different kinds of self-
government for Crimea before the referendum, complete 
separation might have been avoided. One option might have 
been a form of self-government and sovereignty of the kind 
that Canada has negotiated with its native peoples and in 
which relations between the two entities concerned are based 
on treaty obligations rather than on political rights.
Even in the absence of meaningful diplomacy, Crimea 
managed to come away from the crisis virtually without violent 
incident. Was this simply luck? What would have happened if 
Putin’s forces had not scrambled into Crimea? There is little 
doubt that Crimea would have sought independence anyway 
– and a good chance that it would have done so through force, 
meaning Crimea could easily now be a bloody battleground. 
This conclusion is based largely on prior history, notably the 
occasions in 1991 and 1992 when the Crimean parliament 
voted for autonomy (‘within an independent Ukraine’) – an 
endeavour in which they were ultimately thwarted, in 1994, 
by the then leader of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma. In addition, 
transfer payments from Kiev to Simferopol have been 
shrinking over the last two decades and the prospect of 
remaining part of an economically even weaker Ukraine would 
have been unappealing.
In retrospect, it is clear that the West underestimated 
Crimea’s importance to Russia. Putin’s actions now also 
come across as clearly pre-emptive in nature: in the context 
of his fear that he was about to lose the peninsula to a pro-
Western government – and along with it a long-standing 
arrangement for leasing naval facilities – his choices become 
understandable, if only at a strategic level. And understanding 
an adversary’s motives is a vital ingredient of effective crisis-
related decision-making and diplomacy.
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regiments that fought at Sevastopol in 1854–6 and pointing 
to their Ukrainian roots will do nothing to alter this situation. 
Unless the Crimean War features prominently in the annals of 
Ukrainian history, and unless Ukraine claims ownership of it, 
the myths about it will remain lodged in Moscow.
Simply put, the Russian myth about Crimea succeeds 
because it is inclusive: in principle anyone can become part 
of it; ethnicity is secondary. Considering the timing of its 
appearance, and the circumstances, some would say the 
Crimean version of the Russian myth is actually the Soviet 
myth. Maybe so, but it exists nevertheless.
The Crimean Tatar Myth
The Crimean Tatars also have a myth about Crimea. This is the 
story of the ‘stolen motherland’, of three and a half centuries 
of autonomous governance as part of the Crimean Khanate. 
It tells of the deportation of an indigenous people and their 
replacement by newcomers and people shipped in from Russia 
and Ukraine. It tells of a pre-war, multi-ethnic Crimea where 
the Crimean Tatar language was a vital lingua franca.
The weak point in this myth is its exclusivity. It is, so to 
speak, defensive and was originally aimed at preserving, 
rather than extending, an ethnic group’s boundaries. This was 
natural: on returning from deportation, the Crimean Tatars 
found themselves in a minority on the peninsula and their 
prime objective was to re-establish an identity for themselves 
in the region. They therefore worked to stave off dissolution 
and assimilation, and the Crimean Tatar myth, which enabled 
them to define boundaries between Self and Other, helped 
them in this task. But therein lies the problem with the myth: 
it is difficult to be part of it if you are not a Crimean Tatar. 
It is premised on ethnic and territorial autonomy, parliamen-
tary quotas, and a system of preferences. With its antago-
nistic overtones, the myth tends to galvanize opponents as 
well as supporters.
The Ukrainian Myth
The Crimean Tatar myth is increasingly being embraced by 
Ukraine as its own. This is understandable: twenty years after 
independence Ukraine still has no conception of its own in 
regard to the peninsula. Its authority there is established in 
law but not yet legitimized in myth: legitimacy of that kind is 
not about legality but about popular assent and willingness to 
conform. And yet all the conditions were in place for Ukraine 
to forge a Crimean myth of its own – not a militaristic or 
historical or religious one, but something simple and practical.
Such a myth could, for example, have been based on the major 
role that Kiev has played in rebuilding the peninsula since 
the transfer of the region to Ukraine in 1954, establishing 
communication systems and supplying all vital needs. After all, 
amongst the justifications offered at the hand-over sixty-one 
years ago was ‘the commonality of economy, geographical 
proximity and tight domestic and cultural ties between the 
Crimean region and the Ukrainian SSR’. 
The supply of fresh water to the peninsula via the North 
Crimean Canal, the provision of electricity and goods – the 
Ukrainian myth about Crimea could have been built on the 
routine but vital details of everyday life. Prosaic-sounding, no 
doubt, and no match for the booming pathos of slogans about 
‘Russia’s Jerusalem’. 
One of those who wanted to inject new meaning into 
the peninsula was the economist Andrey Klimenko. Urging 
Ukrainians to look to the present rather than the past, he 
suggested shifting the peninsula’s focus towards cooperation 
within the Black Sea region, with a view to transforming the 
area into a communications hub and investing it with new 
parameters and dynamics. These ideas would fit in well with 
the Ukrainian myth described above, producing an inclusive 
story with which all could identify, regardless of nationality. 
So far, however, no one has paid any attention: inertia has 
carried the day.
Who wins?
Legitimizing as it does the return of the peninsula to Kiev, 
the Crimean Tatar myth benefits Ukraine. The Russian myth, 
meanwhile, naturally strengthens Moscow’s hand – especially 
since Kiev does not seek to claim ownership of the portion 
of shared Ukrainian –   Russian history that has an imperial 
narrative. Significantly, the legislation restoring the rights of 
people deported on ethnic grounds, kept in abeyance by the 
Ukrainian parliament for many years, was only adopted on 17 
April 2014, just one month after the annexation of Crimea. And 
Russia made its own attempt at appropriating the Crimean 
Tatar cause by according the Crimean Tatar language official 
status in the peninsula’s constitution – a move undermined by 
the subsequent closure of the Tatar television channel and 
the regular subjection of activists to interrogation.
To some, the issue of myths may seem of secondary 
importance: what determines the course of politics, they say, 
is economics and military strength. But the modern world 
is a space inhabited by more than just statistics, energy 
supplies, and firepower: it is also a space of symbols. People’s 
perceptions generate and shape public demands and these 
demands in turn shape political action – which, incidentally, 
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is why Crimea was designated ‘Russia’s Jerusalem’ and the 
Donbas, for example, was not.
A fact worth reflecting on.
1  English version at p. 18 in this vol-
ume. First published in Ukrayins’ka 
Pravda : http://www.pravda.com. 
ua/rus/articles/2015/04/24/ 
7065788/.
2  This idea derives from Dostoevs-
ky’s Brothers Karamazov and has 
become a new meme in modern 
political mythology.
This article was inspired by long discussions with the Ukrainian 
journalist Pavel Kazarin and by his recent article ‘Three Myths 
for Crimea’.1 It would be hard to argue with the claim that 
Crimea is a land of three competing myths – the Russian, the 
Ukrainian, and the Crimean Tatar – and there is no doubt that 
following the Crimean referendum and annexation, Ukraine’s 
political elite have tended to focus on the Crimean Tatar 
strand of the story. I would, however, like to challenge the 
commonly held notion that the modern Ukrainian state has 
given up on the Ukrainian myth of Crimea.
Russian Mythology
Underpinning Russia’s geopolitical ambitions and expansionist 
policies towards its neighbours is the myth of the ‘Slavic/Russian 
world’. In the nineteenth century, this myth encompassed 
Ottoman Porte territory in the Balkans; in the twenty-first 
century it extends over the former Soviet republics. Russian 
historical myths talk of Russians as a ‘God-bearing people’,2 
as keepers of ‘traditional values’, or as members of a ‘Russian 
Orthodox civilization’ that is neither European nor Asian but 
follows its own ‘third way’. The Russian political elite draws 
on this mythology to try to rationalize the cultural, social, 
and economic backwardness of a country that essentially 
constitutes the rearguard of Western civilization. Other myths 
evoke the ‘victorious Russian nation’3 that will keep the Western 
powers in their place. In these narratives, ‘the West’ figures as 
The Quest for a Political 
Mythology: Ukraine and  
the Crimean Tatar Story
Serhii Kostynskyi
3  In reference to the crucial role 
played by the Soviet Union in the 
Second World War.
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an enemy constantly seeking to enslave or destroy ‘the Russian’ 
or ‘the Orthodox’. These myths explain Russia’s urge to mobilize 
and its isolationism and readiness to keep replaying the Cold 
War scenario. They also function as ‘millennium programmes’ 
for newly emerged states with Russian-speaking minorities.
Crimean Mythologies
Crimea is a potential home to three different ethnic myths: 
the Crimean Tatar, the Russian, and the Ukrainian. In reality, 
however, the area is crammed full of autochthonous myths 
relating to one people only – the Crimean Tatars. Rooted in 
this region, this group have gradually fashioned and reinforced 
various myths about their origins, about their significance for 
the peninsula, and about their special role within Ukraine. One 
such myth presents the Crimean Tatars as issuing from all the 
different peoples who have inhabited the peninsula, another 
as an indigenous people that has its own unique statehood 
and is now undergoing a third Russian occupation. Operating 
at a number of levels – historical, territorial, political, and 
national – these myths have more recently also assumed 
the colours of Ukrainian patriotism: Crimean Tatars as the 
foremost Ukrainians of Crimea.
Neither Russians nor Ukrainians – the main beneficiaries of 
Soviet and Ukrainian statehood – have been able to develop 
comparable myths and galvanize social support for them. As a 
result, they have been less successful in mustering themselves 
around their particular political agendas. The Ukrainian myth 
in Crimea, for example, has remained marginal: the many 
years of unrelenting Russification undergone by Ukrainian 
settlers has resulted in their being largely absorbed into the 
mass of ‘Russian-speaking Soviet peoples’. Those Ukrainians 
who have preserved their ethnic identity often operate with 
myths that juxtapose Ukraine and Crimea, or Ukrainian history 
and Crimean history. Such patriots still talk enthusiastically 
about the Cossack Zaporizhian Sich, symbolically underlining 
the fact that they too came to Crimea many years ago, from 
the mainland. Again, the myth concerning the post-1954 
economic revival of Crimea as part of Ukraine, though useful 
in bolstering state propaganda in war, largely ignores the 
indissoluble cultural and historical ties that bind the two 
neighbouring lands. Meanwhile, the ‘Russian myth’ currently 
being promoted by the occupying authorities in Crimea is 
in fact a ‘Russian Soviet myth’ and is being drummed into 
Crimean heads artificially, mechanically, ‘from above’. Over 
the past twenty-three years, this myth had gradually lost its 
shine and power: no officially imposed myth can perpetuate 
itself, or its social base, forever, and without ‘government 
support’ and active propaganda, belief in it runs into the sand. 
True, following the occupation of Crimea, many Crimeans 
nostalgic for Soviet times took delight in reviving Soviet 
practices: ‘young pioneer’ organizations came back to life and 
portraits of Stalin reappeared at parades. But the myth is an 
official, ‘top-down’ phenomenon with no connection to those 
on the ground, and as time goes on and political fatigue and 
economic decline set in, all this nostalgia will peter out and 
hatred of Russian officialdom will return.
People may talk smugly about the fact that throughout the 
years since independence, Ukraine did nothing to encourage 
grassroots support for an ‘official Ukrainian myth’ in Crimea, 
but this is to overlook the basic fact that Ukraine is not Russia. 
The Ukrainian state is outranked by its Russian counterpart. To 
put it another way, if the Russian state is ‘sovereign and God’ 
(Leviathan), the Ukrainian state is nothing but a collection 
of ‘presumptuous servants’. Its political elite has never had 
total control over the regions and this fact has facilitated 
the emergence of a strong Crimean Tatar myth, issuing not 
from the Ukrainian state but from Crimean society itself. In a 
longer-term perspective, this myth may serve as a source of 
hope to all Ukrainians that they, in their turn, will find a future 
in Europe. For all of us in Ukraine, this is a heartening – if not 
immediately realizable – ‘plus’.
The ‘black box’4 factor from the behaviourist domain is also of 
relevance in regard to the Ukrainian political system: to get an 
output there has to be an input. But – to put it in cycling terms – 
if you want to get from A to B, you need to get on the state 
bicycle and do the pedalling yourself. The ‘Just do it!’ sentiment – 
quintessentially Ukrainian – has been much in evidence in the 
recent surge in volunteer activity. Clearly, the state’s inertia 
and poor functionality poses risks in terms of its oversight of 
national security. At the same time, it creates massive scope 
for societal initiatives and a chance for Ukrainians to rid them-
selves of the kind of paternalism and collective shirking of re-
sponsibility that engulfed Russian society for so long.
Why, then, should Ukraine’s new policy in regard to Crimea 
be based on the Crimean Tatar myth? Because it is the only one 
that has inner strength and the only one that brings Ukraine 
into Crimea’s symbolic space. It is also the only one that has 
been consistently on offer to Ukrainian politics over a long 
period. The Crimean Tatars, who make up 13 per cent of the 
population of Crimea, have not only created a myth of their 
own; they have fed that myth into Ukraine’s political ‘black 
box’. By lending their support to the national democratic camp, 
they have signed up to the Ukrainian nation-building process. 
It is a stance they reaffirmed with their defiant gestures in the 
early phase of the occupation of Crimea – gestures paid for 
with the loss of their independent media5 and the enforced 
exile of the Mejlis.
4  Easton, David (1965), A Frame-
work for Political Analysis, Engle-
wood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
5  Notably the ATR television 
channel.
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Part II  
Constructing  
‘the Ukrainian Nation’: 
the Role of Civil Society  
in the Nation Building  
Process After the Crimean 
Referendum
Symbols, Meanings,  
and Conflicts:  
How the Interpretation of 
History Influences Contem-
porary Events in Ukraine
Oksana Danylenko
With conflict ongoing in Ukraine, there is an urgent need for 
scholarly reflection on the mind-sets that have brought us here – 
and in particular on the symbolic level that has played such 
a key role in both escalating and attenuating the hostilities. 
There is a strong dependence between contemporary social 
conflicts and conflicts in the interpretation of historical 
events and this has to be taken into account when it comes 
to exploring the differing interpretations of symbols. My 
preferred approach is that of lingua-conflict analysis, a 
method involving examination of conflict through text and 
discourse. With this technique, language of conflict can be 
used as an indicator of the conflict potential of particular 
socio-cultural identities.1
The term ‘language of conflict’ is here used to denote 
a specific semiotic system capable of demarcating and 
conveying levels of conflict potential on a scale ranging from 
‘conflict’ to ‘consent’. Language of conflict has its own set of 
rules, linked directly to the values and norms of a specific social 
system in relation to which that language is apprehended. 
The major finding to emerge from my investigations is that 
current conflicts are closely linked to interpretations of past 
conflicts, particularly at the symbolic level. In order to show 
precisely how such interpretations have intersected in Ukraine, 
1  The key findings of my 2005/6 
research, and the methodologi-
cal approach used, are described 
in the book ‘Language of conflict 
in a transforming society: 
from construction of history 
to social identities formation’ 
(Vilnius, EHU 2007). See also: 
Danylenko, Конструирование 
истории и конфликтный 
потенциал социокультурных 
идентичностей в Украине 
(2005–2006, 2013–2014) // 
Перекрестки, N 1–2, 2014, 
Журнал исследований 
восточноевропейского 
Пограничья, Вильнюс, Литва, 
Европейский гуманитарный 
университет, С. 24–45. 
3130
I propose to give a brief overview of the results of my 2005/62 
and 2013/143 research.
One key aspect dealt with in the research-interviews was 
broached in the form of the following question: ‘Please 
name three historical events that you consider particularly 
significant. Please give a description of the events, providing 
an indication of content, participants, meaning, ‘heroes and 
anti-heroes’, what happened and how, sequence of events, 
etc.’ For the 2014 interviews, questions were added about key 
Euromaidan and Anti-Maidan symbols.
The themes and events that figured most prominently in 
the narratives of the citizens of Kharkiv and Lviv respectively 
(2005/6 interviews) were:
For Kharkiv – 
• The Great Patriotic War and the Nazi occupation
• Collectivization, the extermination of the ‘kulaks’
• The 1933 and 1946 famines
• Arrests and repression under Stalin
• The construction of factories, railroads, cities
• Stalin’s death, his personality cult and its debunking
• Tales of grandparents’ days in the Komsomol4
For Lviv – 
• Aversion to the communist party
• The 1946 famine (known as the ‘Holodomor’)
• The horrific cruelty of the NKVD5 
• The people’s reaction to Stalin’s death
• War-time tales (‘Grandpa fought in the Great Patriotic 
War’ – referred to as ‘World War II’ in most other in-
terviews) and stories about the UPA6 (‘They were 
our brothers and sisters’) and the Ukrainian ‘Galicia’ 
Division7
From an analysis of the transcripts of this first batch of 
interviews, two major conclusions can be drawn: firstly, there 
are crucial differences of interpretation between eastern 
and western Ukrainians in regard to the Great Patriotic War/
World War II and the Revolution of 1917; secondly, the term 
‘Soviet’ has a predominantly negative connotation in Lviv 
(‘They enslaved us and decimated us’) and a predominantly 
positive one in Kharkiv (‘We were busy building and restoring; 
we had won’).
The 2014 research, using the same methods, indicates that 
the above conclusions are still relevant for Kharkiv. In addition, 
analysis of various slogans and posters used by Euromaidan 
and Anti-Maidan protesters points up connections with 
the oral-history themes that divided the Lviv and Kharkiv 
interviewees. Take, for example, the responses of Kharkiv 
citizens when asked to say what they associated with two key 
symbols – the Euromaidan slogan ‘Glory to Ukraine! Honour to 
the Heroes’ (in Ukrainian: ‘Слава Україні! – Героям слава!’)8 
and the Anti-Maidan St George ribbon.9
The following is a list of the negative (l.) and positive (r.) 
responses given in regard to the slogan ‘Glory to Ukraine! 
Honour to the Heroes!’:
Clearly, the slogan evokes very diverse sentiments in regard 
to both the past and the present and these differences of 
interpretation correlate with those that emerged in relation 
to the oral-history subject-matter. However, such conflicts 
are resolvable through a ‘transformation of meaning’ and a 
‘distancing’ from the past. The following additional responses 
from the interviews illustrate the first of these processes – 
the transformation of meaning:
‘I think that over the last while our country has 
sort of come together, become more united, and 
very few people make the connection that this is 
a rallying cry, a slogan – “Hail to the Banderas!”. 
At least that’s how it seems to me and I’m glad.’(3)
8   The key slogan of Euromaidan 
2014. Used as a greeting 
amongst members of Stephan 
Bandera’s army (the UPA) during 
World War II.
9   A ribbon with three black and 
two orange stripes. A key Anti-
Maidan symbol, it previously 
had a very different connota-
tion, being worn by veterans on 
Victory Day (9 May) and used to 
decorate wreaths commemorat-
ing those killed in World War II.
2  The 2005/6 research comprised 
96 problem-oriented in-depth 
interviews with experts and 
with individuals drawn from 
several generations in Kharkiv, 
Lviv, and Crimea plus content-
analysis of approximately 200 
historical textbooks published 
in Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus 
between 1924 and 2005.
3  The 2014 research comprised 
26 problem-oriented in-depth 
interviews plus analysis of 
symbols, slogans, and posters 
featuring in demonstrations in 
Kharkiv.
4  All-Union Leninist Young Com-
munist League.
5  The NKVD (Народный 
комиссариат внутренних дел 
– People’s Commissariat for 
Internal Affairs) was a Soviet 
police agency.
6  Although modern Ukrainian 
historical textbooks depict the 
UPA (Українська Повстанська 
Армія – Ukrainian Insurgent 
Army) as fighting both against 
the Soviet Army and against 
the Nazis, doubts continue to 
be expressed about this (both 
in the media and in everyday 
discourse).
7  The ‘Galicia’ Division was a 
Ukrainian division of the Ger-
man Waffen SS.
•  Nothing good. Ukrainian nationalism. 
(1) 
•  It’s a purely Banderite slogan. It’s un-
acceptable to us here in the east. It’s a 
totally Banderite slogan. (4)
•  Nationalism … Fascism … nationalism. 
(2)
•  Ambivalent … it still has overtones of 
the UPA. (2)
•  I think of the fact that some ‘heroes’ 
– in quotes – have basically split apart 
our great country, our power . . . I don’t 
approve. (1)
•  I think the heroes should really be 
honoured because what Ukraine 
means more than anything is oneness, 
an oneness that takes in all these dif-
ferent events. I think most people are 
united and realize that our Ukraine is a 
united Ukraine. (2)
•  When I hear a slogan like that, I take 
it positively. I know people who stand 
by this slogan, I’ve seen people stand 
by it. (2)
•  Patriotic associations, a patriotic at-
titude. (4)
•  Associations with people defending 
their country. (1)
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‘Just taking the slogan by itself. I only recently 
found out about it. If you think about the meaning 
of the words, it’s a great slogan – “Glory to 
Ukraine! Honour to the heroes!” What can I say 
about the slogan except that it’s a good slogan. 
(3)
Currently, associations deriving from perceptions of the 
past are increasingly shifting to the present-day plane. The 
cry ‘Glory to Ukraine! Honour to the Heroes!’ is now often 
associated with heroes of the present age – the ‘Heavenly 
Hundred’ shot on the Maidan, for example, or the Ukrainian 
soldiers currently defending the country. Little by little, the 
historical dimension is receding into the background – though 
the existence of this subtext provides ongoing opportuni-
ties for linguistic manipulation in the information war 
against Ukraine.
On the ribbon
Turning to Kharkiv citizens’ views on the St George ribbon – 
a key symbol of the Anti-Maidan in 2014 – I list a range of 
answers given during the interviews in response to the 
question ‘Please complete the following sentence: “When I 
see someone wearing the St George ribbon, I think . . .”.’
‘This person has respect for the past.’ (1)
‘I used to think “The 9th of May will soon be 
here”, but now I think. . . what do you call it? . . . 
“Separatism . . . will soon be here.”’ (3)
‘A symbol of victory.’ (1)
‘I used to associate it with Victory Day but now [I 
associate it] with some rather weird people.’ (2)
Here we see a variety of interpretations associated with both 
present and past. Next, I would like to show how the conflict 
between these is resolved, as in the case of the slogan, 
through a ‘transformation of meaning’ or ‘distancing’:
‘The initial idea of the St. George ribbon was really 
good – I mean the idea of respect for people who 
laid down their lives for their country. But now, 
for me – and for many others, I think – it’s come to 
represent something negative because it’s being 
used as a front by people who are committing 
senseless brutal acts.’ (2)
‘[It’s] about the war veterans … the Great Pa-
triotic War … well, World War II. Not about the 
confrontation between Russia and Ukraine or … 
pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian. Only about the 
veterans. ‘(2)
The transformation of meaning is still going on: the Saint 
George ribbon is becoming less and less associated with World 
War II and increasingly linked to current events taking place in 
an entirely different context. This shift has been particularly 
marked following various events in 2015 and the ribbon has 
now acquired a ‘separatist’ connotation, having been actively 
promoted by supporters (some armed) of the so-called 
Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Re-
public (LNR). All this suggests a significant increase in the 
negative associations surrounding these symbols in the 
present context. As a result, the Saint George ribbon is not a 
feature of daily life on the streets of Kharkiv in 2015.
The symbols discussed here thus come to be interpreted 
in new ways and acquire new layers of meanings as a result 
of being placed in new contexts and used in particular social 
situations. Through repetition, their new connotations es-
tablish themselves through typification and are legitimized.10 
In short, a new process of construction of meaning evolves 
based on contemporary everyday practice.
Overall, then, my conclusions would be: firstly, that there are, 
as might be expected, conflicts in the ways in which eastern and 
western Ukrainians interpret key historical events – due in part 
to differences in biographical context, life experiences, and 
family histories (as explored in my 2005–6 research); secondly, 
that there is a correlation between attitudes to current events 
and perceptions of historical events, including at the symbolic 
level; and thirdly, that the meanings of symbols from the past 
change when they are placed in a present-day context but that, 
importantly, the former semantic fields continue to exist. The 
variety of biographical experience involved produces a multi-
dimensional conflict of interpretations. This means that, as 
far as modern-day Ukraine is concerned, the ascription of 
historical meaning, even at the symbolic level, is likely to 
exacerbate friction, and that, conversely, to lessen dissension 
and promote resolution of contemporary Ukrainian conflicts, 
historical reference should be kept to a minimum.
10   Numbers in brackets indicate 
the generation: Generation 1 – 
present-day students, whose 
historical knowledge has been 
acquired mostly through the 
discourse of independent 
Ukraine; Generation 2 – ‘chil-
dren of perestroika’, who were 
students during the 1990s, 
studied USSR history at school 
and got to know Ukrainian his-
tory at university;  
Generation 3 – the ‘Soviet gen-
eration’, whose school and uni-
versity studies were dominated 
by the Soviet discourse; and 
Generation 4 – the elderly, eye-
witnesses to events before, 
during, and after World War II.
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against neo-cultural approaches. Most anti-corruption reforms 
follow the logic of principal–agent theory and ‘assume that 
the problem of corruption lies exclusively with the agent [and 
that there is always a principal] who will take on the role of 
controlling corruption’.6 A number of major critics, however, 
point out that this approach cannot work in systemically corrupt 
societies, where corruption has become a ‘collective action 
problem’7 and the supposed principal is also corrupt. Miller 
et al.8 coined the term ‘culture of corruption’ to describe the 
regional particularities of post-Soviet corruption, including the 
legacy of communist-regime corruption and the effects which 
the transformation-process had on corruption in the region 
concerned. Based on a study of petty corruption in Ukraine, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, they pointed to the 
‘corruptibility’9 of both regular citizens and officials. However, 
in her study The System Made Me Do It, Karklins documents the 
tendency of citizens to blame ‘the system’ (the term commonly 
used to describe networks of power in post-Soviet space) for 
the extent of such ‘corruptibility’ in their countries.10
These approaches to explaining corruption face a ‘chicken 
and egg’ dilemma: if citizens are corruptible, and there is no 
‘principal’ willing or able to act, there is no way the system 
can be changed; but the same applies if ‘the system’ itself 
promotes the corruptibility of its citizens.
Given this problem, it is important to settle on a definition 
of the terms ‘culture of corruption’ and ‘system of corruption’ 
when used in relation Ukraine. In what follows, the first will be 
used to denote a culture of mutual favours11 tacitly accepted 
both by officials and by regular citizens and involving petty-
level corruption. At issue here is the kind of corruption 
used mainly in order to bypass bureaucracy and ‘get things 
done’ promptly. The high level of tolerance to corruption 
in transition countries has much to do with the legacy of a 
communist system that was based on non-monetary privileges, 
daily reliance on mutual favours, and a lack of clear separation 
between the public and the private.
By contrast with this institutionalized petty corruption, 
‘system of corruption’ will denote widespread, high-level 
political – in other words grand – corruption. What emerged 
as the dominant feature of political corruption in Ukraine was 
the close interdependence between the political system and 
oligarchic interests. Although petty and grand corruption 
can exist in parallel, there is often a ‘pyramid of upward 
extraction’,12 in which petty corruption can be reinforced by 
grand corruption.
Under the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, the system 
of corruption became highly centralized and a pyramid of 
extortion was deliberately created in which petty corruption 
was reinforced and the proceeds of fraudulent activities flowed 
upwards, delivering gains to a handful of actors – known as ‘the 
Anti-corruption Reform 
in Ukraine: Prospects and 
Challenges
Oksana Huss
When the ‘Global Corruption Barometer’ survey was carried 
out in Ukraine in 2013, 84 per cent of respondents said they 
believed the government was run ‘by a few big entities acting 
in their own interests’1 and one in three declared themselves 
ready to engage in active protest against corruption. Likewise, 
in a poll of those taking part in the Maidan protests – a 
movement dubbed a ‘revolution of dignity’ in the Ukrainian 
national discourse – three-quarters named the removal of the 
corrupt Yanukovych regime as one of their prime demands, 
whilst a little under half wished to see those involved in 
political corruption brought to book.2
The revolutionary momentum, combined with strong 
pressure from international organizations (anti-corruption 
reforms are a precondition for IMF loans to Ukraine), resulted 
in the adoption of new anti-corruption legislation by the 
Ukrainian parliament on 14 October 2014.3 However, this 
is not the first time such measures have been introduced in 
Ukraine: new anti-corruption laws have been adopted during 
every presidency since independence in 1991 – to no avail. We 
therefore have to ask whether these latest reforms will fare 
any better, in other words what challenges they are likely to 
encounter and what prospect they have of success.
In addressing these questions, I focus on two theoretical 
approaches to the persistence of corruption in post-Soviet 
countries – the culture-based and the system-based.
The major critiques of international anti-corruption reforms 
in general,4 and of Ukrainian measures in particular,5 have 
taken shape in the context of the debate pitting neo-classical 
1  Transparency International Glob-
al Corruption Barometer, http://
ti-ukraine.org/en/news/2815.
html, accessed 04.07.2015.
2  The figures were 75.1 % and 
49.6 % respectively. The survey, 
involving 1,037 Maidan partici-
pants, was conducted on 7 and 
8 December 2013 by the Demo-
cratic Initiatives Foundation and 
the Kyiv International Institute 
of Sociology. See: http://www.
dif.org.ua/en/events/gvkrlgka-
eths.htm, accessed 07.04.2015.
3  Law ‘On the Fundamentals 
of Anti-corruption Policy 
in Ukraine (Anti-corruption 
Strategy) To Be Effective within 
2014–2017’.
4   Persson, A., Rothstein, B., and 
Teorell, J. (2013), ‚Why Anticor-
ruption Reforms Fail-Systemic 
Corruption as a Collective 
Action Problem‘, Governance 26: 
449–71.
5   Grodeland, Å.B. (2010), ‚Elite 
perceptions of anti-corruption 
efforts in Ukraine‘, Global Crime 
11: 237–60.
6   Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 
2013: 453.
7   Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 
2013: 458.
8   Miller, W.L., Grodeland, Å.B., 
and Koshechkina, T.Y. (2001), A 
Culture of Corruption? Coping 
with Government in Post-Commu-
nist Europe, Central European 
University Press.
9   Described elsewhere by Miller 
as the readiness to engage in 
bribery in concrete situations 
despite theoretically con-
demning it: Miller, W.L. (2006), 
‘Corruption and Corruptibility’, 
World Development 34: 371–80.
10   Karklins, R. (2005), The System 
made me do it: Corruption in 
post-communist societies, New 
York: M.E. Sharpe.
11   Miller, Grodeland, and Ko-
shechkina 2001: 15.
12   Andvig, J.C. (2001), Corruption: 
A Review of Contemporary Re-
search, Report, Chr. Michelsen 
Institute, Development Studies 
and Human Rights, Bergen, 11.
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family’ – and resulting in the gradual elimination of political 
competition. The claim that ‘the system’ forced citizens to be 
corrupt is thus justified in this case. Ultimately, however, the 
bare-faced venality pushed citizen dissatisfaction to a critical 
level, resulting in a ‘revolution of dignity’ that defied the 
widespread culture of corruption.
Political corruption did not disappear with the change of 
regime: it was its quality rather than its quantity that was 
affected by the revolution. Having become decentralized, it 
remains systemic but now has no single entity overseeing 
it. Several pyramids of corruption exist side by side, thus 
preventing the political leadership from being the sole 
beneficiary of the illicit activities taking place on its watch.13
Against this background, what are the prospects for 
Ukraine’s new national anti-corruption strategy? Although 
it will be some time before the strategy delivers any results, 
it has at least three innovative features that mark it out 
from previous initiatives of this kind and warrant a degree 
of optimism.
First, the relevant legislation draws a distinction between 
grand and petty corruption. The strategy for the period 
2014–17 focuses on the system of corruption, targeting 
organized activity rather than individual people and 
transactions. This focus is reflected in the legislation’s overall 
approach, which aims at transparency (in party funding and 
state budget-spending, for instance), accountability (with a 
view to establishing an independent judiciary, for example), 
and elimination of corruption schemes (of the kind currently 
prevalent in public procurement and the management of 
state-run enterprises14). Although there is a dearth of political 
will to get these measures implemented, the fact that the 
‘system of corruption’ has been recognized as an urgent 
problem, and that its role in encouraging corruption at every 
other level has been acknowledged, is in itself an achievement. 
The legislation creates a formal framework that precludes the 
further centralization of corruption and provides a basis for 
the development of a transparent political lobby-system, to 
replace the illicit influence of the oligarchs.
Second, the decentralization of corruption, and the 
concomitant fragmentation of resources, has created the 
possibility of political competition and bolstered democratic 
development, producing a situation in which civil society has 
been able to thrive and begin to play a critical ‘watchdog’ 
role in the development and implementation of reforms. 
The national anti-corruption strategy itself was developed 
by state institutions and civil-society experts working in 
collaboration, and the involvement of civil-society in the 
implementation-process is actually enshrined in the strategy. 
In addition, Chapter 5 of the strategy addresses the problem 
of the ‘culture of corruption’ and includes a list of measures 
designed to encourage citizens’ rejection of corruption and 
decrease their ‘corruptibility’. The key role in anti-corruption 
education and awareness-raising is entrusted to civil society.
Third, the new anti-corruption infrastructure includes 
both a National Anti-Corruption Bureau – an independent 
body tasked with investigating high-level corruption – and 
a National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, which, 
amongst other things, will monitor conflicts of interest. A 
number of anti-corruption bodies were already in existence 
in Ukraine prior to these reforms, but being part of ‘the 
system’ they could not have functioned effectively and, in a 
worst-case scenario, could have been used as a tool against 
the opposition. Effective investigation and control is only 
possible with a politically independent set of structures 
and, in this connection, the chief obstacle to the effective 
operation of the new anti-corruption infrastructure will be 
Ukraine’s continuing lack of an independent judiciary.
13  Stefes, Christoph H. (2006), 
Understanding Post-Soviet 
Transitions: Corruption, Collu-
sion and Clientelism, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 3.
14  On this, see the amendments 
of 15 April 2014 to the Law on 
Public Procurement.
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and discourse. It has become part of the official symbolism 
and imagery of Ukraine, featuring in the national anthem, on 
Ukrainian banknotes, and in a host of other places.3
By contrast, reaction to the idea of UPA fighters as national 
heroes has been mixed. The change in the political situation in 
Ukraine, and the opening-up of archives in the early 1990s, led 
to a boom in the historiography of the OUN and UPA and, as 
a corollary of this, to a radical revision of the Soviet account 
of these organizations. In the new national ideology, the view 
on the role of these erstwhile ‘traitors’ has undergone a major 
shift. The pro-independence movement ‘Rukh’, particularly 
strongly supported in western Ukraine, was one of the first to 
raise the issue of OUN and UPA rehabilitation.4
Once the violence escalated, however, the situation changed 
radically. This process began with the forcible dispersal of 
student demonstrators and the ratcheting-up of anti-Maidan 
propaganda. Any kind of protest-gathering was portrayed as a 
Fascist horde or a pack of bloodthirsty nationalists. Hundreds 
of thousands of people who supported the Maidan movement – 
some of them coming to take part just at the weekend – were 
baffled to find themselves being branded as ‘nationalists’ or 
given labels, such as banderivky (‘female follower of Bandera’), 
or in general banderivtsi (‘follower of Bandera’), which they 
had never even heard of.
Another factor in the popularization of these newly 
revived names from the past – ‘real Cossacks’, banderivky, 
banderivtsi – has been the search for ‘true’ paradigms of 
Ukrainian femininity and masculinity in post-Soviet times – 
and particularly during the Maidan protests.5 The rapid and 
dramatic course of political events in Ukraine in the wake of 
Maidan and the subsequent war in the Donbas has raised the 
profile of militaristic masculinity. Ukrainian men have had 
an opportunity to live out ‘in the concrete’ a model of the 
Ukrainian war-hero initially promoted ‘in the abstract’ as part 
of the new, post-Soviet, national ideology, and this in turn 
has reinforced gender-divisions and the gender-hierarchy 
in Ukraine. For certain sections of society, including many 
of the male activists of Maidan and Donbas, the continuity 
with the heydays of the OUN, the UPA, and the Cossacks has 
endowed the experience of victimhood and bravery with new 
meaning. This nationalist sentiment, in which celebration 
of Cossackhood and the UPA merge into one, is no longer 
confined to the ranks of the ‘Svoboda’ party. The events of 
the moment have invested militaristic masculinity with a 
particular symbolic meaning, the notion of men as defenders 
and warriors has elicited particular interest and regard, and 
men have been given an opportunity to emulate, and share in, 
the glory of Ukraine’s bygone heroes.
The figure of the strong, unconquerable, freedom-loving 
warrior associated with the Cossacks and the fighters of 
2  Yekelchyk, Serhy (2004), 
Stalin’s Empire of Memory: 
Russian-Ukrainian Relations 
in the Soviet Historical 
Imaginatio,. Toronto: 
University of Toronto 
Press. The hetman Bohdan 
Khmel’nytskyi was one 
of those thus heroized 
(Yekelchyk 2004: 20–3).
3  Bureychak, Tetyana (2009), 
‚Cossacks in Ukrainian 
Consumer Culture: New 
Old Masculinity Model‘, in 
Alp Biricik and Jeff Hearn 
(eds.), Proceedings from 
GEXcel Theme 2: Decon-
structing the Hegemony 
of Men and Masculinities. 
Conference 27–29 April 
2009, Linköping: Institute 
of Thematic Gender Stud-
ies, 215–26; cf. by the same 
author (2013): ‘Zooming In 
and Out: Historical Icons 
of Masculinity Within and 
Across Nations’, in Jeff 
Hearn, Katherine Harrison, 
and Marina Blagojevic 
(eds.), Rethinking Trans-
national Men: Beyond, Be-
tween and Within Nations, 
New York and London: 
Routledge.
History and Gender in the 
Euromaidan Protests
Olena Petrenko
Despite Ukraine’s twenty-year history of state independence, 
the Soviet past continues to function as a major point of 
reference for the country and has profoundly influenced its 
visions for the future. The dramatic events of Euromaidan, 
and the subsequent war in the Donbas, have lent added 
importance and relevance to the task of revisiting the national 
past and identifying heroes – both old and new.
Of particular interest to me in my research is the way in 
which the Euromaidan protesters made use of historical facts, 
figures, symbols, and meanings to connect with Ukrainian 
history – indeed, to make themselves part of it – and thus 
establish their legitimate place in both the past and future 
of the country. I look specifically at the narratives of two 
groups of ‘heroes’ – the Cossacks and the UPA1 fighters – and 
consider the gender-related aspects of the current discourse 
on national identity and hegemonic masculinity.
Why the choice of Cossacks and UPA fighters? At first sight, 
the level of integration of these two groups into the hegemonic 
national narrative appears to differ. The Cossack era in Ukraine 
was mostly glossed over in Soviet historical accounts, for fear 
of sparking nationalist or separatist feeling among Ukrainians. 
During the 1930s and 1940s, however, selective rehabilitation 
of the Cossack legacy took place – prompted, according to 
Serhy Yekelchyk, by a desire to find positive heroic images 
amidst the events surrounding the Second World War.2 In the 
post-Soviet period, there has been a new wave of interest in 
the Cossacks, in celebrating them as national heroes and 
promoting this image of them in various ways. Cossackhood 
has been incorporated into social activities (notably sport) 
and popular and consumer culture. It has permeated both 
grass-roots Cossack communities and state-level initiatives 
1  Ukrainska Povstanska Armia – 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army, a mili-
tant formation of the Organiza-
tion of Ukrainian Nationalists 
(OUN). The OUN was created in 
Vienna in 1929 with the primary 
purpose of securing independ-
ence for Ukraine – a struggle it 
often conducted through sabo-
tage, expropriation, and assas-
sination. In 1940, the OUN split 
into OUN-M (with an older and 
more moderate membership 
that supported Andrii Mel’nyk) 
and OUN-B (with younger and 
more radical members who 
backed Stepan Bandera). In June 
1941, acting independently of 
the Nazi authorities, OUN-
B declared an independent 
Ukrainian state, to which the 
Germans responded by arrest-
ing the OUN leaders. After this, 
the Ukrainian Insurgent Army 
fought both Nazi Germany and 
the Soviet Union – the latter 
struggle continuing until the 
late 1950s. The Ukrainian rebel 
movement became one of the 
Soviet regime’s main enemies 
and the insurgents adopted a 
‘deep underground’ strategy 
that came to be known as the 
‘bunker war’. The struggle of the 
OUN and UPA was marked by 
widely practised violence involv-
ing terrorist activities, retalia-
tion against communists and their 
families, and anti-Polish pogroms. 
This brutality played a crucial 
part in shaping the ambivalence 
that currently prevails in regard 
to the activities of the Ukrainian 
nationalist underground in Volyn 
and East Galicia from 1929 to the 
1950s. For a detailed treatment of 
this, see: Bruder, Franziska (2007), 
“Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen 
oder sterben!” Die Organisation 
Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 
1929–1948, Berlin: Metropol; Mar-
ples, David (2010), ‘Anti-Soviet 
Partisans and Ukrainian Memory’, 
East European Politics & Societies 
24 (1): 26–43; Shkandrij, Myroslav 
(2015), Ukrainian Nationalism. 
Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 
1929–1956, Yale University Press.
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the OUN and UPA featured prominently in the Maidan 
protests, where ordinary men had a chance to live out these 
fantasies of heroic masculinity. One remarkable illustration 
of the way in which the Cossack and OUN/UPA strands came 
together symbolically, visually, and transhistorically was a 
large free-standing poster which was used as a backdrop for 
souvenir photos (Fig. 1). Positioned inside the Kiev City State 
Administration building, it depicted a Cossack and a UPA 
fighter standing shoulder to shoulder over the foe they have 
just vanquished – a member of the ‘Berkut’ special police force.
Fig. 1: Poster ‘Revolutionary Commandant of the Kyiv City Council’, Kiev 
City State Administration building, 2 January 2014 (photo: Olena Petrenko).
Equally indicative here is the case of Mychailo Havryluik, a 
Maidan activist and member of the Fourth Sotnya6 who 
attended the protest after learning of the beatings of 
students on the night of 30 November 2013. Havryluik became 
widely known after a video was circulated showing him being 
stripped naked in the freezing cold and tortured by the Berkut 
riot-police. Through social media, his unshakeable ‘Cossack’ 
resolve not only made him into a symbol of protest but also 
won him the admiration and respect of women as a ‘real 
Cossack’ and a ‘real man’.
The gender-related expectations that arose in relation to 
the Maidan protests were strongly binary and hierarchical: 
men were seen as the nation’s ‘defenders’ and ‘driving force’; 
women were viewed as weak, vulnerable, and in need of male 
protection. On the night of 11 December 2013, when police 
surrounded the demonstrators and began to force them out 
of the square, numerous calls went out over the Internet 
advising women to stay at home, prompting the formation of 
a group called ‘Half of Maidan: Women’s Voice of Protest’. This 
group set about subverting the hegemonic masculine warrior 
narrative, which had greatly intensified during the Maidan 
protests, with slogans such as ‘We do barricades as well as 
bread and butter’ and ‘Glory to the heroines!’
The masculine narrative emphasized male patriotism and 
military prowess and lauded motherhood: man’s mission 
is to lead, control, and protect; woman’s is to ensure the 
nation’s reproduction, physically and symbolically. Beyond 
this re-traditionalization of gender hierarchies, however, ‘[a]
nother important phenomenon to track is the way women 
in the national and volunteer armed forces in Ukraine have 
been sexualized in images circulating in the press and social 
media’.7 A T-shirt currently available in Ukraine (Fig. 2) fea-
tures a woman with long red hair dressed in tightly fitting 
clothes and carrying a machine-gun. On the woman’s right 
hip a nationalist-style tattoo is visible and on her cheek is 
a painting of the red-and-black UPA flag. This banderivka 
combines battle-hungriness and combat-readiness with 
what are clearly deemed to be quintessentially Ukrainian 
good looks.
Fig. 2 (left): T-shirt on sale in Ukraine, autumn 2014 (photo: Tetiana 
Bureychak).
Fig. 3 (right): Black-and-white reproduction of Ihor Pereklita’s painting I 
Am a Banderivka, 2007 (photo: Carmen Scheide).
Rather more historical is a painting by Ihor Pereklita (Fig. 3), 
available at the Maidan protests in the form of black-and-
white stickers. Pereklita is actually known for his mockery 
of nationalist stereotypes and this 2007 picture, depicting a 
‘real’ banderivka as she would have appeared at the time the 
Ukrainian nationalist underground was active, was originally 
intended as a critique of nationalism. The subject of the 
painting is a glamorous blonde woman wearing Ukrainian 
national dress and armed with a gun. In one hand she holds a 
grenade, in the other a bunch of snowberries (often used to 
symbolize Ukraine), and at her feet is a skull and a hedgehog 
with some apples. The picture bears the legend ‘I am a 
banderivka. I am Ukrainian. Death to the Muscovite Occupiers.’ 
The image lays bare the disparate notion of femininity at work 
here: the protagonist is attractive and well-groomed but the 
identity she projects is primarily one of a woman breaking 
7  Philips, Sara (2014), ‚The 
Women’s Squad in Ukraine’s 
protests: Feminism, nationalism, 
and militarism on the Maidan‘, 
American Ethnologist 41 (3): 
414–26, this quote 420.
4  Shevel, Oksana (2011), ‚The 
Politics of Memory in a Divided 
Society: A Comparison of Post-
Franco Spain and Post-Soviet 
Ukraine‘, Slavic Review 70 (1): 
137–64, esp. 148. UPA glorifi-
cation began in earnest with 
Yushchenko’s presidency in 
2005, with the title ‘Hero of 
Ukraine’ being awarded to 
Roman Shukhevych, the UPA’s 
Supreme Commander, in 2007, 
and to Stepan Bandera, head of 
OUN-B, in 2010. The possibility 
of giving OUN and UPA fighters 
equal status with Soviet war-
veterans was also repeatedly 
raised in parliament during this 
period. At a later stage, prior 
to the Maidan events, the ‘Svo-
boda’ party took a leading role 
in promoting national symbol-
ism and tradition as a legitimiz-
ing basis for nation-building and 
cultural renewal. More recently, 
on 9 Apr. 2015, Rada deputy 
Yurii Shukhevych (son of UPA 
commander Roman Shukhevych) 
brought a new bill ‘Concerning 
the Legal Status and Com-
memorating the Memory of the 
Fighters for Ukrainian Independ-
ence in the 20th Century’ before 
the Ukrainian parliament. The 
bill recognized members of the 
OUN and UPA as ‘fighters for 
Ukrainian independence’ and 
accorded them various ‘social 
guarantees’. The bill passed into 
law and was signed by President 
Poroshenko on 16 May 2015.
5  Martsenyuk, Tamara (2015), 
‚Gender I natsiia v ukrainskomu 
suspilstvi: maskulinnosti ta 
Euromaidan 2013–2014‘ (Gender 
and Nation in the Ukrainian Soci-
ety: Masculinities and Euromaid-
an 2013–2014), Ya: gendernyi 
zhurnal 1 (37): 4–9. 
6  Some Maidan protesters organ-
ized themselves into quasi-mili-
tary units based on the ‘sotnya’ 
or ‘company of one hundred’.
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through traditional ‘beauty queen’ perceptions, taking up 
arms, and raising herself to the status of glamorous and 
courageous female warrior.8 
The circulation of these kinds of images amongst the 
Maidan protesters prompted a wide range of sometimes 
conflicting comments – from anarcho-nationalist quips to 
serious observations about the part played by women in the 
protests and the way they embodied both militant resolve and 
quintessential Ukrainian beauty. On the whole, however, the 
message was clear: women were allowed to depart from the 
roles traditionally ascribed to them and display ‘masculine’ 
qualities such as courage but they must remain ultra-‘feminine’ 
whilst doing so. National historical narratives thus reinforced 
the patriarchal social order by granting women temporary 
admittance to a militaristic male world whilst perpetuating 
their sexualization.
Phantom Pain Syndrome: 
The Ukrainian Nation One 
Year after the Annexation 
of Crimea
Milana Nikolko
One year ago, or thereabouts, the history of independent 
Ukraine changed forever. Today, the country is labouring under 
a long-term military conflict; despite the Minsk agreements, 
the sound of artillery-fire continues to be part of daily life in 
the east; and Ukrainian civil society is torn between chaotic 
public debate and carefully constructed propaganda, between 
open political confrontation and backstairs oligarchic warfare. 
More than twelve months after the annexation of Crimea, 
neither Ukrainian society nor its political leaders are able 
to agree on a position to the peninsula.1 Some openly reject 
annexation, others – implicitly or explicitly – accept it, and yet 
others simply ignore the issue, focusing instead on Ukraine’s 
ongoing economic, social, and political problems and the 
course of military operations in the east. Despite these 
differences, the annexation and its aftermath are still driving 
and shaping Ukrainian public discourse. To use a medical 
metaphor, Crimea is a phantom limb – ‘a vivid impression 
that [an amputated] limb is not only still present, but in some 
cases, painful.2
These pressures on Ukrainian society are obscuring one 
of the main challenges facing Ukraine, namely the lack of 
understanding of the colonial narrative and ‘the Other’, 
notably as a result of the dearth of academic reflection on 
the emergence of the modern Ukrainian political nation. This 
brief account seeks to highlight the methodological problems 
1  The only concrete measures 
have been a handful of contro-
versial laws such as the law of 27 
Sept. 2014 ‘On Establishing Free 
Economic Zone “Crimea” and 
Specifics of Economic Activity 
on the Temporarily Occupied 
Territory of Ukraine’.
2  Ramchandran, V.S. and Hirstein, 
William (1998), ‘The percep-
tion of phantom limbs’, Brain 
121 (9): 1603–30, http://brain.
oxfordjournals.org/content/
brain/121/9/1603.full.pdf, ac-
cessed 21.05.2015.
8  Buryechak, Tetiana and 
Petrenko, Olena, ‘Kanapky, 
Sich ta „Banderivky“‘ (Sand-
wiches, Sich and „bander-
ivky“), Zaxid.net, 8 January 
2014, http://zaxid.net/news/
showNews.do?kanapki_sich_ta_
banderivki&objectId=1300428.
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‘culture of memory’ category comprises countries in which 
the political elite have retained the positions they held in the 
Soviet nomenklatura and make frequent reference to what 
they perceive as an ‘ancestral’ link with the Soviet order. They 
may recognize errors and repressive ‘fault lines’ but generally 
assume that the Soviet past was a positive and glorious one. 
The countries in question here are Russia and Belarus.
Falling outside this fourfold typology, and unsure where 
it belongs, is Ukraine. Though working to rid itself of ‘the 
Other’ by embracing Western economic and social ideas, the 
country still has various ‘phantom limbs’ to grapple with. 
By relinquishing these, Ukraine will move firmly into the 
Western camp, inexorably severing its links with its Soviet 
past. Any move to erase the country’s communist history, will 
only reduce the likelihood of reconciliation with Crimea and 
Eastern Ukraine. One such step is the recent adoption, by 
Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), of a package of 
what are commonly dubbed ‘de-communization’ laws.4 Law no. 
2558, ‘On Condemning the Communist and National Socialist 
(Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes and Prohibiting the Propagation 
of their Symbols’, is entirely toponymic in content , targeting 
the symbols of the country’s former communist regime – 
place names, street names, company names evoking political 
figures or parties. The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory 
recently issued a list of just under 900 towns and villages 
earmarked for renaming.5 
With this package of laws, the government is effectively 
decreeing what does and does not constitute ‘true knowledge’ 
about ‘the Ukrainian nation’. Politicians are attempting to 
gain control over political symbolic reality by controlling the 
dominant symbols and ideas. This is a struggle that seems to 
wax and wane with internal political opposition. The gamble of 
rejecting the past in order to embrace an uncertain future may 
well prove successful for Kiev but will entail squaring up to, or 
indeed denying, Ukraine’s uneasy twentieth-century past.
According to Oxana Shevel,6 there are two major problems 
which these laws will not resolve. The first is Ukraine’s 
adherence to the kind of highly politicized approach to 
history adopted during the Soviet era, when the government 
mandated one correct interpretation of history, decided who 
were the heroes and who the villains, and reduced historical 
complexities to black-and-white notions of the ideologically 
good ‘Self/ Collective Us’ versus the ideologically bad ‘Other/ 
Them ’. The second is the legislation’s failure to match up to 
European standards of commemoration, in which civilian 
victims of political violence hold centre-stage and the murder 
and brutalization of civilian populations is condemned 
regardless of the reasons for it.
In sum: Ukraine is evolving in an uncertain, poorly 
coordinated but dramatic way as its present aspirations clash 
that have to be overcome in reaching an understanding of the 
nation-building process in Ukraine.
Having lived in the shadow of ‘Big Brother’ for so long, 
and having acquiesced to Soviet myths about ‘brother 
nations’ (‘bratskie narody’), the country continued, even 
after independence in 1991, to be what was, to all intents 
and purposes, a colony, with a political elite conditioned by 
colonial-style thinking. Now involved in a dramatic conflict 
and afflicted by various kinds of social, political, and physical 
trauma, the country is searching for a new national ideal. Talk 
of ‘the Other’, in the guise of Russia/the Soviet Union, has 
become the dominant narrative in political and social circles. 
Under the influence of this ‘otherness’, a political nation is 
being forged; boundaries of both a physical and a symbolic 
kind are being created, engendering uniqueness and fuelling 
differing notions of national sovereignty. Reflection on the 
role of ‘Soviet otherness’ has never been carried through to 
its conclusion and the result has been the emergence of an 
extraordinary mix of national, Soviet, and global narratives 
in Ukraine.
Of course, Ukraine’s search for a new national narrative is 
not unique. Battles as to how the past should be depicted and 
what images are to be carried forward have been underway 
for many years in most post-Soviet countries. In these 
places, the culture of memory often operates independently 
of ‘professional’ historical accounts, or uses them only as 
occasions for ideological invective.3 Four types of such culture 
are distinguishable, depending on the way in which the 
failures and successes of the communist past are processed 
and acknowledged.
The first type is most evident in countries in which the 
former communist regime is considered politically, historically, 
and ethnically alien to the nation’s ‘organic’ history. Such 
countries would include Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The 
second type includes countries which, whilst recognizing that 
the communist regime was something imposed from without, 
nonetheless actively engaged with the Soviet past as it relates 
to the national context and reflect on the part played by their 
population and elite in constructing that regime. Examples of 
countries where this type of memory prevails include Poland 
and the Czech Republic. The third type of memory, whilst 
acknowledging that communism, having made its entry with 
the Soviet liberators’ tanks at the end of the Second World 
War, was unarguably an externally imposed phenomenon, 
moves beyond this and points to the contribution which the 
socialist order made to economic and social modernization. 
Remembrance of the victims of communist dictatorship 
features only to a very modest extent in this configuration. 
Countries in which this type of culture of memory prevails 
include Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia. The fourth and last 
3  Stefan Trebst [Стефан Требст] 
(2011), Какой такой ковер? 
Культура памяти в постком-
мунистических обществах 
Восточной Европы: попытка 
общего описания и категори-
зации, in Империя и нация в 
зеркале исторической памяти: 
Сборник статей М.: Новое 
издательство, 142.
4  See e.g. Bershidsky, Leonid 
(2015), Nazis Triumph Over 
Communists in Ukraine, http://
www.bloombergview.com/
articles/2015-05-19/nazis-
triumph-over-communists-in-
ukraine; interview with Serhiy 
Ekelchik ‘Не можна нав’язати 
Україні єдиний погляд на «ге-
роїчну УПА» – канадський істо-
рик›, http://www.radiosvoboda.
org/content/article/27024469.
html?utm_medium=email; 
Volodimir Kulik, Про неякі-
сні закони та нечутливих 
критиків. http://krytyka.
com/ua/solutions/opinions/
pro-neyakisni-zakony-ta-
nechutlyvykh-krytykiv.
4  De-Sovietization in Ukraine: 871 
cities, towns and villages free-
ing their names from the Soviet 
legacy, 
http://euromaidan-
press.com/2015/06/12/
de-sovietization-in-
ukraine-871-cities-towns-
and-villages-freeing-their-
names-from-the-soviet-legacy/.
6  Shevel, Oxana (2015), ‘De-
Communization Laws’ Need 
to Be Amended to Conform to 
European Standards, http://
voxukraine.org/2015/05/07/
de-communization-laws-need-
to-be-amended-to-conform-to-
european-standards/.
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with the countervailing influences of the historical ‘Other’. 
As they put their untried nation-building skills to the test, 
Ukrainian politicians are clearly hampered by ‘phantom pain’ – 
reflected, inter alia, in the de-communization legislation. 
The political ‘exercises’ underway in the area of the culture 
of memory are aggravating the social trauma occasioned by 
the ongoing conflict. This is to be expected, given that Crimea, 
Luhansk, and Donetsk are still, symbolically if not actually, 
part of the body politic. The proposed treatment may be 
unreal but the pain is not.
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